We investigate the relation between corporate loan spreads and maturity to test whether lenders are compensated for longer maturity loans (tradeoff hypothesis) or limit their exposure by forcing riskier borrowers to take short-term loans (credit-quality hypothesis). Earlier studies reject the tradeoff hypothesis. We use the LPC DealScan database to create a matched sample of pairs of loans to the same borrower on the same day holding credit quality constant. We perform mean of difference tests and cross-sectional and regression analyses, and find evidence supporting both the tradeoff and credit quality hypotheses.
Introduction
The design and pricing of loan contracts has recently attracted considerable research interest. This line of research seeks to understand the process through which corporate borrowers choose public, private nonbank, and/or private bank debt. In addition, it endeavors to explain how borrowers and lenders settle on key loan contract features, such as maturity and collateral, and how these features are priced. More broadly, work in this area is important in operationalizing theories of financial intermediation based on the premise that loan contract design decisions aim to overcome asymmetries between borrower private beliefs and market assessments of credit quality, and are influenced by reputation and relationship effects (Diamond, 1993; Houston and James, 2001 ; among others). Prior empirical work, as reviewed in Dennis, Nandy, and Sharpe (2000) , has enhanced understanding of why certain loan features, such as maturity and collateral, appeal to firms with particular characteristics, such as high growth and uncertain risk profiles.
Prior research can be grouped into two principal types of studies. First, in the corporate finance literature, a number of studies explore the process through which borrowers choose different proportions of short-term, long-term, collateralized, and noncollateralized debt. Employing balance sheet data, the studies successfully predict these choices at the firm level based on the borrower's risk profile, growth potential, and other characteristics. Examples include Smith (1995a, 1995b) and Stohs and Mauer (1996) . Second, in the financial institutions literature, researchers focus on contract feature choices made by borrowers when negotiating new loans from banks and other private lenders. Examples include Strahan (1999) and Dennis, Nandy, and Sharpe (2000) . Prior research recognizes that three decisions are made simultaneously: the choice of loan spread over LIBOR, time to maturity, and the decision whether to secure the loan using collateral. For example, Dennis, Nandy, and Sharpe (2000) introduce a simultaneous equation model of determinants of contract terms and spreads in revolving credit arrangements between borrowers and banks.
Despite the advances in these prior studies, the link between loan spread and maturity remains open to interpretation because this link reflects two opposing effects. A borrower issuing short-term debt can face costly liquidation at maturity, motivating the borrower to choose longer-term debt. At the same time, lenders prefer short-term debt to control agency problems, such as asset substitution and underinvestment.
1 As a result, borrowers are willing to incur, and lenders demand, higher spreads for loans with longer maturity. Underlying this positive relation between spreads and maturity is the hypothesis that lenders are willing to offer long-term loans to risky borrowers at higher spreads (tradeoff hypothesis). More formally, the tradeoff hypothesis states that the term structure for bank loans is upward sloping, consistent with empirical results for corporate bonds (Helwege and Turner, 1999) and for bank loans (Coleman, Esho, and Sharpe, 2002) .
An alternative to the tradeoff hypothesis holds that, instead of offering longerterm loans at higher rates, lenders limit their exposure through forcing riskier borrowers to take short-term loans (credit quality hypothesis). At the same time, less risky borrowers signal their credit quality by taking short-term loans (Flannery, 1986; Kale and Noe, 1990) , suggesting a negative relation between spreads and maturity. Empirical work by Strahan (1999) finds such a negative relation for his sample of revolving and term loans. Dennis, Nandy, and Sharpe (2000, p. 102 ) also find evidence to support a negative relation for revolving loans, and interpret it as "inconsistent with the tradeoff hypothesis." 2 These empirical findings are puzzling in light of the evidence of a positively sloped term structure for corporate bonds. Further, their interpretation overlooks the possibility that both the tradeoff and credit quality hypotheses reflect reality. When negotiating with individual firms, a bank is willing to accept the spread-maturity tradeoff. However, when structuring its loan portfolio, the bank will limit exposure through truncating the tradeoff by forcing riskier borrowers to take short-term loans. As a result, both the tradeoff and credit-quality hypotheses can hold at the same time; the former at the firm level in comparing alternative packages of contract terms, and the latter between firms, as Helwege and Turner (1999) note for corporate bond spreads. When investigating the relations between corporate loan spreads and maturity, a number of important factors should be controlled, such as loan type and lender characteristics. For example, Coleman, Esho, and Sharpe (2002) note that firms borrowing with revolving loans are larger and less levered than firms borrowing with term loans. An important implication is that it is crucial to conduct tests separately on revolving and term loans to isolate the borrower effects.
This study exploits the existence of a large sample of borrowers engaging in multiple loan contracts with the same lead and participant banks on the same day in the Loan Pricing Corporation DealScan database. Using this sample, the paper tests the tradeoff and credit quality hypotheses using matched pairs of loans, where both loans in each matched pair are made to the same borrower, on the same date, by an identical syndicate of lenders. This approach allows the paper to hold constant the borrower and lender characteristics. To test the tradeoff and credit quality hypotheses, we focus on fee and interest rate spread variables. Following earlier work, the key measure of cost for a loan facility is "all-in-spread-drawn," defined by Loan Pricing Corporation (1999) as "the basis point coupon spread over LIBOR plus the annual fee and upfront fee, spread over the life of the loan." Under the tradeoff hypothesis, we expect this measure to increase as time to maturity increases, while the creditquality hypothesis predicts it will decrease with longer maturity. Mean of difference tests identify significantly larger spreads associated with longer-maturity, term loans, suggestive of a positively sloped term structure. Cross-sectional analyses conducted on paired samples demonstrate that this finding is robust.
To demonstrate that the credit-quality effect works jointly with the tradeoff effect, we next remove the control for the former by dropping our matching methodology and reexamine our sample of loans employing regression analysis. We show that pooled regressions similar to those discussed above lack robustness due to inadequate controls for lender and credit-quality effects. Selected regressions display negative coefficients for maturity, consistent with the credit-quality hypothesis. These findings strongly support our argument that individual borrowers face a positively sloped term structure of lending rates. The negative slope found in prior research arises from the credit-quality effect: lenders force riskier borrowers to take short-term loans.
The rest of this study is organized as follows. Section 1 describes the data and sampling method. Section 2 presents univariate tests of the statistical relation between price and maturity. Section 3 describes multivariate regression analysis and presents the associated results. In Section 4, we offer conclusions.
Data and sampling method
To test the credit quality and tradeoff hypotheses, two data samples are created: a large sample of loans, and a subset of matched pairs. The matched pair subset is formed to isolate the tradeoff effect from the impact of loan quality. Matching entails creating a set of paired observations of two loan deals, differing in maturities, extended to the same company on the same day. We control observable features including the presence or absence of collateral, loan size, and the credit quality of the company. Unobservable features are controlled through matching the two loans in the same day for the same company.
We use the Loan Pricing Corporation DealScan database to extract loan deals initiated between 1988 and 1999, between U.S. banks and nonfinancial U.S. firms. Typically, a loan deal consists of a number of dissimilarly designed loans with common lead and participant banks, designated "facilities," made to the same borrower on a given date. We eliminate any facility for which the "term facility maturity" or "allin-spread-drawn" variables are missing.
We perform our tests separately for term loans and revolving loans. Revolving credit arrangements specify a maximum amount that can be borrowed for the duration of the arrangement. The actual amount borrowed varies from this maximum amount, and there is a commitment fee associated with the unused portion of the credit arrangement. The DealScan database specifies loans that are revolving loans, and we treat other loans as term loans. As noted in Coleman, Esho, and Sharpe (2002) , differences in borrower and lender characteristics between term and revolving loans suggest that empirical tests should be performed separately. Of the facilities that remain following the previous filtering, 11,817 are term loans and 18,358 are revolving loans. We designate this sample of term and revolving loan observations as "full." To prepare for the matched pairs test, we eliminate any loan deal for which the times to maturity of all facilities associated with the loan deal are identical, or only a single facility exists. Of the remaining facilities, 3,112 are term loans and 832 are revolving loans. We designate this sample as "paired."
We next form pairs of facilities where each pair contains a shorter and longer maturity loan from the same deal. If only two facilities are associated with a loan deal, we simply identify one facility as shorter time to maturity and the other as longer. If more than two facilities are associated with a loan deal, we treat every two facilities with different times to maturity as a pair. For example, consider a deal with three facilities, designated A, B, and C. The times to maturity of the three facilities (in months) are 60, 72, and 84, respectively. For the matched pair sample, we create three unique pairs: A with B, B with C, and A with C. Since pairs are formed separately for the revolving and term loan samples, both elements of each pair are either revolving or term.
3 This methodology produces 1,765 term and 433 revolving loan pairs, representing approximately 10% of the total number of U.S. loans available in the database. 4 Table 1 details the sample selection process. Table 2 specifies the variables extracted and the respective units of measure. As well, the table reports the number of facilities for which each variable is nonmissing Table 2 The variables, the variable type, and the number of facilities for which the variable is nonmissing The variables, the variable type, and the number of facilities for which the variable is nonmissing are reported for both the full and paired samples, for both the term and revolving loan samples. As well, the table reports the number of pairs formed from the paired sample for which the variable is nonmissing for both elements, for the term sample, and for the subset of observations consisting of revolving loans. for both the full and paired samples, and the number of pairs for which the variable is nonmissing for both elements. Variables that measure rates include all-in-spread-drawn (RATEAISD), allin-spread-undrawn (RATEAISU), the prime spread (RATEPRIM), and the LIBOR spread (RATELIBO). The all-in-spread-drawn is the sum of the coupon spread and annual fee. The all-in-spread-undrawn is the sum of the commitment fee and annual fee. The prime spread is the spread over the prime rate, while the LIBOR spread is the spread over the LIBOR rate.
Variables that measure fees include upfront fees (FEEUPFRO), commitment fees (FEECOM), letter of credit fees (FEELC), and cancellation fees (FEECAN). Upfront fees are one-time fees that are typically collected at the close of the deal. Commitment fees are charged on the unused portion of the credit. Letter of credit fees are the annual fees charged related to the issuance of letters of credit. Cancellation fees are charged against termination or reduction of the commitment.
A number of variables measure other loan characteristics. TFCMAT is the term to maturity of the loan facility, measured in months. ln(AMTFCSIZ) is the natural logarithm of the loan facility size. COLLAT is a dummy variable that controls for collateralization, and is equal to one if the loan is secured with collateral and zero otherwise. BWMD is the Moody's senior debt rating for borrowers, and is our measure of credit quality. A cardinal ranking that decreases in risk and ranges from 8 (riskiest) to 28 (least risky) was established, corresponding to the Moody's letter values. Table 3 reports the mean value and standard deviation for each variable, for the term and revolving subsets of both the full and paired samples. For each variable, we examine whether means differ significantly between term and revolving loans within the full sample and again within the paired sample. All differences between term and revolving loans are statistically significant for both the full and paired samples, with the exception of FEECAN for the paired sample. Within the full sample, economic differences are small between means of term and revolving loans, with the exception of RATEISD. In the paired sample, revolving loans are shorter, exhibit lower spreads, are less likely to be collateralized, and are higher quality. These differences are significant within the paired sample. They are generally consistent with Coleman, Esho, and Sharpe (2002) . Further, we examine how sample characteristics shift when we introduce pairing. For term loans, comparing the features of the full sample with the paired sample reveals that the loans in the paired sample have longer maturities and higher spreads. They are larger, more likely to be collateralized, and of lower credit quality. Turning to revolving loans reveals that compared to the full sample, paired loans are similar in maturity, have somewhat lower spreads, and are less likely to be collateralized. Borrowers in the paired sample are slightly smaller.
Univariate analysis
We begin our analysis by counting the number of times that the longer maturity facility of the matched pairs is associated with a higher, identical, or lower value for Table 3 The mean value and standard deviation for each variable The mean value and standard deviation for each variable are reported for both the full and paired samples, for both the term and revolving loan samples. Variable definitions are as follows: TFCMAT is the term facility maturity. RATEAISD is the rates all-in-spread-drawn. RATEAISU is the rates all-in-spread-undrawn. RATEPRIM is the rates prime spread. RATELIBO is the rates LIBOR spread. FEEUPFRO is the fees upfront. FEECOM is the fees commitment. FEELC is the fees LC. FEECAN is the fees cancellation. ln(AMTFCSIZ) is the ln(Amount facility size the rates-all-in-spread-drawn (RATEAISD) variable, relative to the shorter maturity facility (Table 4) . These values are reported for both the term and revolving samples, for all matched pairs, and are reported separately for matched pairs associated with borrowers that have Moody's senior debt ratings of A, B, C, and unrated. We also report the percentage higher, identical, and lower, and the number of pairs for each sample.
For the term sample, we find strong evidence that the longer maturity facilities are associated with higher spreads than the shorter maturity facilities. Overall, for 71% of the matched pairs the longer maturity facility is associated with higher spreads than the shorter maturity facility, while the reverse is true for only 6% of the matched pairs. For the A, B, C, and unrated borrowers, we find that for 45.5%, 77.1%, 91.7%, and 68.6% of the matched pairs the longer maturity facility is associated with higher spreads than the shorter maturity facility, respectively. The reverse is true for only 18%, 2%, 4%, and 8% of the matched pairs, respectively.
The results are more ambiguous for the revolving sample. Overall, 26% of matched pairs exhibit higher spreads for the longer maturity facility over the shorter facility, while the reverse is true in 17% of the matched pairs. More interestingly, spreads are identical in 57% of the matched pairs. This result appears consistent for borrowers rated A, B, C, and unrated, with identical spreads in 65%, 61%, 67%, and 56% of matched pairs, respectively.
We next perform mean of difference tests for the pairs formed from the term and revolving loan paired samples. For each variable, we calculate the mean of the difference for all observations, for all pairs for which the variable is available. We calculate the Student's T-statistic and Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test to test whether the positive association of maturity with loan spreads posited by the tradeoff hypothesis is supported. The results of these tests are reported in Table 5 .
By construction, there is a large difference for the "term facility maturity" variable, TFCMAT, for both samples. For the term sample, longer maturity loan facilities are, on average, approximately 22 months longer in maturity than shorter maturity facilities. For the revolving sample, the difference is approximately 30 months. These differences are statistically significant at the 1% level.
There is strong evidence that the longer maturity facilities are associated with higher rates for the term sample (Panel A). All-in-spread-drawn, prime spread, and LIBOR spreads are approximately 28.3, 22.9, and 36.3 basis points larger than shorter maturity facilities, respectively, at the 1% level. As well, the longer maturity facilities are associated with all-in-spread-undrawn spreads that are approximately 4.6 basis points larger than shorter facility maturity facilities at the 5% level. The difference in rates associated with the revolving sample (Panel B) is weaker, with the all-in-spreadundrawn rate approximately 1.8 basis points larger for the longer maturity facilities, statistically significant at the 1% level. There are no other statistically significant differences in rates for the revolving sample.
There is no statistically significant difference in loan commitment or cancellation fees for either sample. All-in-spread-drawn includes both spread and fees, and the Table 4 Counting tests
The number of times that the longer maturity facility of a matched pair has a higher, identical, or lower value for the rates all in spread undrawn (RATEAISD) variable relative to the shorter maturity facility is reported. These values are reported for both the term and revolving samples, for all matched pairs, and are reported separately for matched pairs associated with borrowers with Moody's senior debt ratings of A, B, C, and unrated. We also report the percentage higher, identical, lower, and the number of paired observations for each sample. nonsignificance of fees suggests that differences are due to spreads. The commitment fee is not statistically different for the term sample. For the revolving sample, the commitment fee is approximately 1.2 basis points higher, significant at the 10% level. For the term sample, the upfront fee is approximately 14.5 basis points smaller for the longer maturity facilities, significant at the 1% level. No significant difference in upfront fee was found for the revolving sample.
The difference of means test for both the term and revolving samples suggests that longer maturity facilities are larger than shorter maturity facilities. The average natural logarithm of the longer maturity facilities is approximately 0.05 and 0.41 larger than their shorter maturity counterparts for the term and revolving samples, respectively. These differences are significant at the 5% level for the term sample and at the 1% level for the revolving sample. To facilitate economic interpretation, we translate the differences into dollars. For the term sample (Panel A), the mean difference in loan size is approximately $1.05 million, relatively minor compared to an average size for the shorter maturity loan of approximately $37.88 million. For the revolving sample (Panel B), the mean difference in loan size is approximately $1.51 million. This amount is also relatively minor compared to an average size for the shorter maturity loan of approximately $19.63 million. These differences in size between the longer and shorter maturity facilities do not pose a threat to our methodology because any bias introduced is in the direction of rejecting our hypothesized tradeoff effect.
5
Finally, there is no statistically significant difference between the percentages of facilities collateralized for the longer and shorter maturity components of both the term and revolving samples. The lack of significance is not surprising, as 96% of term loans and 84% of term loans are collateralized.
6
Highlighting our most important results, our counting (Table 4 ) and paired tests (Table 5) contradict finding in earlier studies of a negative relation between spreads and maturity for bank loans, and reinforces Helwege and Turner's (1999) findings for corporate bonds. For the term loans we find a significant, positive relation and for the revolving loans there is no significant relation. This suggests that the term structure of credit spreads is flat initially (for short-maturity revolving loans) and then becomes upward sloping (for long-maturity term loans). These paired tests are convincing as facility size, collateral, and bond rating as well as lead and participant banks are controlled perfectly through the matching technique we employ.
Multivariate analysis
In Section 3, we demonstrate that longer maturity facilities are associated with higher spreads. The evidence of significant association between spread and maturity within pairs supports the tradeoff hypothesis. However, several outstanding issues remain. First, the mean of difference tests identified significant differences in facility size between the longer and shorter components. While we argued that these significant differences do not weaken the evidence that higher spreads associated with longer maturity facilities are due to the longer maturity characteristic, a formal test is required to confirm that other characteristics associated with the longer maturity facilities explain the higher spreads. Second, if the spread difference between the longer and shorter facilities is attributable to the difference in maturity, is this difference in spread invariant to the riskiness of the firm? The tradeoff hypothesis suggests that the spread difference should widen as the borrower becomes riskier. We address these issues through performing cross-sectional and regression analyses. Further, an important theme of this paper is that the positive relation between spreads and loan maturity at the borrower level can be obscured in pooled regressions. As discussed earlier, this occurs because pooling introduces credit quality effects across firms. We test for the impact of pooling through conducting regression analysis.
Cross-sectional analysis
In Table 6 , we report cross-sectional mean of difference tests conditioned on two variables: loan size and bond rating. For both the term and revolving loan paired subsets, we calculate the difference of the loan size variable between the longer maturity and shorter maturity facilities for each pair. We then place pairs into one of ten groups of equal size, where the first group represents the pairs with greatest differences, and each subsequent grouping contains pairs with smaller differences. We then perform mean of difference tests for the RATEAISD and loan size variables for all pairs within each group. We also report the average bond rating values for the pairs within the group.
In the lower panel of Table 6 , we repeat this approach through placing pairs into one of ten groups on the basis of the bond rating value for the pair, and again perform mean of difference tests for the RATEAISD and loan size variables for all pairs within each group. We cannot perform a similar analysis based on groupings on the basis of the COLLAT variable. This is because the vast majority of pairs display no difference for the COLLAT variable, as the vast majority of loan facilities are collateralized, effectively resulting in only two groups.
For the term subset, the grouping on the basis of the difference in the loan size variable demonstrates that the longer maturity facility is associated with higher spreads than the shorter maturity facility regardless of the difference in the loan size variable, with the exception of one grouping. Further, the difference in rate spread increases across groups (moving down the upper panel of Table 6 ) as the longer maturity facilities become increasingly smaller than the shorter maturity facilities. For group 10, the rate spread associated with the longer maturity facility is, on average, approximately 34.19 basis points larger than the shorter maturity facility. Conversely, for group 1, the rate spread associated with the longer maturity facility is, on average, approximately 0.13 basis points larger than the shorter maturity facility.
For the revolving loan subset, the grouping on the basis of the difference in Table 6 Cross-sectional mean of difference tests the loan size variable only finds differences in spreads when the differences in the loan size variable are large. For group 10, the rate spread associated with the longer maturity facility is, on average, approximately 22.05 basis points larger than the shorter maturity facility. Conversely, for group 1, the rate spread associated with the longer maturity facility is, on average, approximately 29.60 basis points smaller than the shorter maturity facility. For the term subset, the grouping on the basis of the bond rating demonstrates that, as predicted under the tradeoff hypothesis, riskier firms are associated with larger differences in spreads between longer maturity and shorter maturity facilities. The five riskiest term groups (6 through 10) have an average RATEAISD difference of means value of approximately 35.81 basis points, while the five least risky term groups (groups 1 through 5) have an average RATEAISD difference of means value of approximately 28.10 basis points. Further, the least risky term group, group 1, does not have a significant difference of means associated with the RATEAISD variable. For the revolving subset, the grouping on the basis of bond rating variable does not find statistically significant differences in spreads.
Regression analysis
Regression tests do not incorporate the pairing technique employed in Section 3 to isolate the impact of the tradeoff effect. There we found strong support for the tradeoff hypothesis contrary to the results of prior studies using pooled regressions. Because the regression technique pools observations across companies, it allows for the operation of the credit-quality effect. Thus, in conducting regression tests, we are testing for the net impact of the two effects. If we find a negative coefficient for maturity, this will be evidence supporting the presence of both effects, correcting the conclusions of prior papers that only the credit-quality effect holds.
We investigate these issues through performing regressions relating loan spreads and maturity, while controlling for other loan contract characteristics. Unlike Dennis, Nandy, and Sharpe (2000) and Coleman, Esho, and Sharpe (2002) , our regression specifications do not account for simultaneity in the choice of contract terms such as collateral and maturity and the determination of the spread. Hence, a negative coefficient on maturity would support the presence of both effects. Panels A and B of Table 7 present the correlations between the variables used in the regression tests for the full and pooled paired samples, respectively, and reflect the collinearity noted in earlier research.
To test the core spread-maturity relation, all of the regression tests use "all-inspread-drawn" as the dependent variable and "term facility maturity" as an independent variable. Other independent variables are included to control for facility size, the presence of a collateral provision, and risk. The regression model tested is as follows:
This model is estimated using four methods, with each method imposing different restrictions. The first method tests the relation between spreads and the time to maturity variable exclusively. The second method controls for facility size as well. The third method also controls for the presence of a collateral provision. The fourth method controls for riskiness as well.
Three types of regressions are performed: First, we run the regression tests for Table 7 Correlations This table shows correlations between variables for the full sample (Panel A), pooled observations associated with the paired sample (Panel B), and pair data associated with the paired sample (Panel C). Variable definitions are as follows: RATEAISD is the rates all-in-spread-drawn. TFCMAT is the term facility maturity. ln(AMTFCSIZ) is the ln(Amount facility size). COLLAT is the collateralized/noncollateralized dummy variable. BWMD is the Borrower Moody Senior Debt Rating. Diff RATEAISD is the difference in the value of RATEAISD between the longer maturity and shorter maturity facilities for each pair. Diff RATEAISD, Diff TFCMAT, and Diff ln(AMTFCSIZ) are the differences in the values of the RATEAISD, TFCMAT, and ln(AMTFCSIZ) variables, respectively, between the longer maturity and shorter maturity facilities for each pair. all data, using the debt-rating variable, BWMD, to control for differences in riskiness. Second, we rerun the regressions for the paired data using differences within pairs. Third, as a robustness test, we form two subsamples based on whether the debt rating is reported by the DealScan database, and repeat the regressions for each subsample.
Regression analysis, entire sample
We perform regression methods one through four for both the term and the revolving sample. For each of the samples, we run the regressions for all nonmissing facilities. We estimate the regressions for the full and paired samples.
The results of the regression tests are in Table 8 . Overall, consistent with our pre-diction that pooling would confound the results, the regression tests do not revalidate the positive relation between rate spread and maturity identified in our paired tests. Starting with the term paired sample in the upper half of Table 8 , the coefficients associated with the TFCMAT variable are significant and positive for regressions 2 and 3, at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively, but lack significance in regressions 1 and 4. The coefficients associated with ln(AMTFCSIZ) are negative in regressions 2 and 3, significant at the 1% level, and insignificant in regression 4. The ln(AMTFCSIZ) coefficient value is −15.56 for regression 2 and −13.97 for regression 3. The coefficients associated with COLLAT are positive for regressions 3 and 4, significant at the 1% level. The COLLAT coefficient value is 52.71 for regression 3 and 65.68 for regression 4. The coefficient associated with BWMD, in regression 4, is 10.17. The intercept ranges from 281.75 (regression 1) through 530.74 (regression 2). For the full sample of term loans (lower half of Table 8 ), two regressions have a positive coefficient for TFCMAT, one displays a negative coefficient and one shows no significance for maturity. Once again, pooling undermines the robustness of our results. Next, we turn to the revolving loans regression tests. Again, our benchmark for comparison remains the paired tests that show no significant difference in spreads and suggest that the term structure is flat. The paired sample regressions are also insignificant, with one exception. The comparisons in Table 3 show that moving from the paired revolving loan sample to the full sample does not increase maturity significantly but increases size and reduces the percentage collateralized. These confounding effects are associated with a switch in sign for the TFCMAT coefficient, which turns significantly negative in three of four full sample, revolving loan regressions. Put another way, because they treat jointly determined variables as exogenous, regressions can only imperfectly control for other variables impacting spreads while collinearity among these variables causes regression coefficients to lack robustness.
The significant coefficients associated with the TFCMAT variable are generally positive for the paired sample and negative for the full sample. In relation to this effect, note that the paired sample only includes firms that have loan deals with multiple facilities, while the full sample permits single facility loan deals. Hence, an alternative explanation for the differences in the signs of the coefficients is that firms that receive multiple facilities differ fundamentally from firms that receive single facilities.
Regression analysis, paired differences
In this section we report results obtained through replicating our regressions for the paired sample using differences in the variables rather than levels for spread, maturity, and size, while retaining the level as a measure of bond rating. We seek to develop a third comparison to the cross-sectional analysis and regressions presented earlier. We further investigate these relations through performing regressions Table 8 Regression analysis, entire sample
This table shows regression of RATEAISD against TFCMAT, ln(AMTFCSIZ), COLLAT, and BWMD for the term sample and revolving sample, for both the pooled paired and full samples. Variable definitions are as follows: RATEAISD is the rates all-in-spread-drawn. TFCMAT is the term facility maturity. ln ( relating loan spreads to differences in maturity, differences in size, and riskiness. The regression model tested is as follows:
where Diff RATEAISD, Diff TFCMAT and Diff ln(AMTFCSIZ) are the differences in the RATEAISD, TFCMAT, and ln(AMTFCSIZ) variables between the longer and shorter maturity elements of each matched pair. As before we test the model estimated using five methods, with each method adding variables in turn. Panel C of Table 7 presents the correlations between the variables used in the regression tests. The regressions are performed separately for the term and revolving loan samples.
The results of the regression tests are reported in Table 9 and demonstrate that for both the term and revolving loan samples, differences in size (Diff ln(AMTFCSIZ)) and bond rating of the pair (BWMD) are generally associated with significant negative coefficients. For these two variables, the regressions of differences in Table 9 validate the cross-sectional analysis. Turning to maturity, the significant coefficients associated with the Diff TFCMAT variable are uniformly negative (with only a single coefficient significant for the revolving loan sample). As in our earlier regression results, inadequate controls for risk allow the impact of credit quality to dominate.
The intercept for these regression equations can be interpreted as the average difference in RATEAISD, given the various control variables. Thus, regression 5 provides the average difference after controlling for facility size and riskiness. The intercept is largest when both size and rating are controlled. This validates our key result that lenders are compensated for longer maturity loans. 
Regression analysis, rated versus unrated subsamples
This section reports results of tests conducted for the two subsamples that were formed based on whether the DealScan database reported the debt rating. Dropping the bond rating variable, BWMD, we rerun regressions 1 through 3. In particular, we seek to ascertain whether the coefficients obtained for some of the regressions in Table 8 are robust to the reporting of bond ratings in the DealScan database.
Beginning with the paired sample in Panel A of Table 10 , comparison of the results against those in the upper half of Table 8 demonstrates that the coefficients for size, ln(AMTFCSIZ), uniformly carry negative signs, while the coefficients for the collateral dummy, COLLAT, uniformly carry positive signs, as in Table 8 . We conclude that the impacts of size and collateral on spreads are robust to the alternative specification for risk controls introduced here. Focusing on the coefficient for maturity (TFCMAT), a similar comparison between tables reveals that significant coefficients (in Panel A of Table 10 ) are generally positive, with the exception of a negative coefficient associated with regression 1 for unrated revolving loans.
Panel B of Table 10 carries on these comparisons for the full sample. We find that the signs of the size variable and the collateral dummy are exactly as in Table 8 . Interestingly, the significant TFCMAT coefficients associated with unrated facilities are negative for both the term and revolving loan samples, and are negative for the rated revolving sample as well. The finding of significant positive coefficients associated with the TFCMAT variable for the paired sample and negative coefficients for the full sample is similar to our results for the regression tests of the entire sample. As noted earlier, an alternative explanation for the differences in the signs of the coefficients could be that firms that receive multiple facilities differ fundamentally from firms that receive single facilities.
In summary, our regressions suggest two conclusions. First, credit spreads decrease with borrower size, and are higher for collateralized borrowers. These relations are robust to whether the debt rating is reported by the DealScan database. Second, similarly to pooling across maturities, pooling across credit ratings masks the impact of the credit-quality effect. 
Conclusions
This paper examines the relations between corporate loan spreads and maturity. Using the Loan Pricing Corporation DealScan database, we empirically test whether lenders are compensated for engaging in longer maturity loans (tradeoff hypothesis) or, alternatively, limit exposure through forcing riskier borrowers to take short-term loans (credit-quality hypothesis).
We create a large sample of matched pairs of loans of different maturities made by the same lead and participant banks, on the same day to the same company. Since the risk of the borrower is identical by construction within each pair, we are able to control borrower and lender characteristics. Our matched pairs analysis demonstrates that the longer loans have higher spreads than shorter loans, supporting the tradeoff hypothesis. For term loans we find a significant, positive relation, but no significant relation for revolving loans. This suggests that the term structure of credit spreads is flat for short-maturity revolving loans and then becomes upward sloping for longmaturity term loans. These paired tests are convincing as facility size, collateral, and bond rating as well as lead and participant banks are controlled perfectly through the matching technique we employ.
Further tests suggest that the credit-quality hypothesis is also supported. Setting aside the matching technique, and with it the control on credit quality, we conduct regressions on a larger sample. The significant coefficients associated with the maturity variable are generally positive for the paired sample and negative for the full sample. This suggests that both tradeoff and credit-quality effects are present. However, there is a possibility that endogeneity and collinearity issues disrupt these inferences. An alternative explanation for the differences in the signs of the coefficients is that the firms in the paired sample that receive multiple facilities are somehow different from firms in the full sample receiving single facilities. Exploration of this alternative explanation is left for future research.
When negotiating with an individual firm, a bank is willing to accept a spreadmaturity tradeoff, causing the borrower to face an ascending term structure of loan spreads. However, when structuring its loan portfolio, the bank can limit exposure through truncating the tradeoff by forcing riskier borrowers to take short-term loans.
